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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
NO. 06-4422
                    
 GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
v.
JULIO ORTIZ GARCIA
Appellant
                    
On Appeal From the District Court of the
Virgin Islands, Division of St. Croix, Appellate Division  
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 05-cr-00018)
Hon. Raymond L. Finch, Chief District Judge
Hon. Curtis V. Gomez, District Judge
Rhys S. Hodge, Territorial Judge
                   
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 8, 2007
BEFORE:  SLOVITER, STAPLETON and
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed May 11, 2007)
                    
OPINION OF THE COURT
                    
2STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
I.
Appellant Julio Ortiz Garcia was convicted of attempted rape in the first degree
(Count 1), two counts of rape in the first degree (Counts 2 and 3), unlawful sexual
conduct in the first degree (Count 4), kidnapping for rape (Count 5), and two counts of
child abuse (Counts 6 and 7).  These convictions arose from a series of events on the
same day involving a 15- year-old female victim.  Garcia also had a prior conviction for
rape of a three-year-old victim.  The Superior Court imposed a 25-year sentence on Count
1, a 99-year sentence on Counts 2 and 3, a 25-year sentence on Count 4, a 99-year
sentence on Count 5, and a 20-year sentence on Counts 6 and 7.  The sentences on Counts
1 through 4 are to run concurrently, as are the sentences on Counts 5 through 7.  Garcia
can thus be required to serve two consecutive sentences of 99 years each for rape in the
first degree and kidnapping with the intent to rape.
Garcia argues before us that the Appellate Division erred in affirming the Superior
Court’s (1) denial of his motion to suppress the victim’s out-of-court and in-court
identifications of him, and (2) rejection of his contentions that the sentences imposed
violated both the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
and the Fifth Amendment’s protection against multiple punishments for the same offense. 
In his informal pro se brief, Garcia also insists that there was insufficient evidence to
support the rape convictions.  We will affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division
     We do not agree, however, with the Appellate Division’s apparent suggestion that1
concurrent sentences for the same offense do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, see
Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856 (1985).  But that suggestion is not essential to its
holding that Garcia’s rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause have not been violated.
3
essentially for the reasons given in its thorough opinion.1
II.
As the Appellate Division noted, while the “show up” of Garcia was “suggestive,”
it is not at all clear that it was “unnecessarily suggestive” as those terms are used in Neil
v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).  Courts have consistently acknowledged the necessity of
utilizing “show ups” under certain circumstances, despite their inherent suggestibility. 
See Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Callwood, 440 F.2d 1206, 1209 (3d Cir. 1971).  We agree
with the Appellate Division, however, that one need not resolve that issue in order to
sustain the Superior Court’s denial of Garcia’s suppression motion.  A pre-trial
identification is suppressible only if it is both produced through an unnecessarily
suggestive procedure and unreliable.  See Biggers, 409 U.S. at 196-99.
The “show up” identification of Garcia bore many and strong indicia of reliability. 
Garcia lived next door to the victim and she had seen him on numerous occasions.  She
had an ample opportunity to observe him during the perpetration of the crimes and
provided police with a detailed and accurate description of him and his clothing prior to
the “show up.”  The “show up” identification occurred just minutes after the crimes and
was instantaneous and unequivocal.
4Under these circumstances, the Superior Court did not err in denying suppression
of both in- and out-of-court identifications.  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Gomes v. State
of New Jersey, 464 F.2d 686, 687-88 (3d Cir. 1972).
III.
As we recently observed in United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237 (3d Cir.
2006):
When evaluating proportionality challenges to sentences under the Eighth
Amendment, courts must examine three factors:  (1) “the gravity of the
offense and the harshness of the penalty”; (2) “the sentences imposed on
other criminals in the same jurisdiction”; and (3) “the sentences imposed for
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.”  Solem, 463 U.S. at
290-292, 103 S. Ct. 3001.  When conducting this analysis, this Court has
recognized that we “‘should grant substantial deference to the broad
authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and
limits of punishments for crimes.’”  Rosenberg, 806 F.2d at 1175 (quoting
Solem, 463 U.S. at 290, 103 S. Ct. 3001).
This principle of substantial deference therefore “restrains us from
an extended analysis of proportionality save in rare cases.”  Id. (quoting
Solem, 463 U.S. at 290 n.16, 103 S. Ct. 3001).  Consequently, in assessing
such a challenge, the first proportionality factor acts as a gateway or
threshold.  If the defendant fails to show a gross imbalance between the
crime and the sentence, our analysis is at an end.  We, therefore, must focus
upon whether MacEwan’s is “the rare case in which a threshold comparison
of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of
gross disproportionality.”  Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30, 123 S. Ct. 1179 (quoting
Hamelin, 501 U.S. at 1005, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (Kennedy, J.))
Id. at 247-48.
All of the sentences imposed on Garcia were within the range authorized by the
Virgin Islands legislature.  Virgin Islands law, for example, authorizes a sentence of life
5imprisonment or imprisonment for any term of years for the crime of rape in the first
degree when the defendant, like Garcia, has an earlier rape conviction.  14 V.I.C. § 1701. 
Moreover, given the character of the offense, the age of the victim, and the fact that these
crimes occurred less than seven months after his release from the prison sentence
imposed for his prior rape, we, too, conclude that there is no “gross disproportionalty”
between the gravity of Garcia’s offenses and the harshness of the penalty.
IV.
Whether two statutes constitute the same offense for double jeopardy purposes is
based not on whether the charges result from the same conduct but, rather, whether each
requires proof of the same elements under the test articulated in Blockburger v. United
States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).  As the Appellate Division persuasively explains, each of the
crimes alleged here requires proof of at least one element not required to prove another of
the alleged crimes.
V.
Corroboration of the victim’s testimony is no longer required in rape cases under
Virgin Islands law, and the evidence at trial provides ample support for the rape
convictions.
VI.
We will affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division and will grant the motion of
appellant’s counsel to withdraw.  See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
